Disorganized Labor: Is Knox v. SEIU the Nail in the Coffin for Public Sector Unions? by Stanley, John
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary
Volume 33 | Issue 2 Article 9
10-15-2013
Disorganized Labor: Is Knox v. SEIU the Nail in the
Coffin for Public Sector Unions?
John Stanley
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Stanley, Disorganized Labor: Is Knox v. SEIU the Nail in the Coffin for Public Sector Unions?, 33 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary
Iss. 2 (2013)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol33/iss2/9
Disorganized Labor: Is Knox v. SEIU the Nail in the 
Coffin for Public Sector Unions?
By John Stanley*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................... 858 
II. BACKGROUND........................................................................... 860 
A. Unions in the United States.................................................. 860 
B. SEIU, Political Player.......................................................... 861 
III. LEGAL FOUNDATION................................................................. 862 
A. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education .................................. 863 
B. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson................ 865 
IV. KNOX V. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION,                
LOCAL 1000.............................................................................. 867 
A. The Facts.............................................................................. 867 
B. District Court ....................................................................... 869 
C. The Court of Appeals............................................................ 870 
V. KNOX AT THE SUPREME COURT................................................. 871 
A. Alito for the Majority ........................................................... 871 
1. Mootness .............................................................................. 871 
2. Compulsory Subsidization of Speech .................................. 871 
3. Hudson Notice and the First Amendment ............................ 872 
B. Justice Sotomayor’s Concurrence ....................................... 876 
C. Justice Breyer’s Dissent ....................................................... 877 
1. The Opt-Out System............................................................. 877 
2. The Special Assessment ....................................................... 878 
3. The Likelihood of a First Amendment Violation................. 879 
4. The Court Entering the Political Realm ............................... 880 
VI. KNOX IN CONTEXT..................................................................... 881 
A. Does Knox Change Anything?............................................. 881 
B. Why Hear the Case? ............................................................ 882 
C. The Larger Union Struggle .................................................. 883 
D. The Cost of Unions............................................................... 885 
VII. CONCLUSION............................................................................. 887 
858 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 5, 2012, voters in the state of Wisconsin and in the 
California cities of San Jose and San Diego dealt a severe blow to the 
unions representing many of their respective government employees.  
In the Badger State, Governor Scott Walker survived a recall vote 
brought on by his aggressive measures limiting Wisconsin’s public 
unions’ rights to bargain collectively over aspects of their 
employment contracts. 1 The California cities’ ballot measures 
dramatically increased the amounts that city workers2 contribute to 
their pension plans, among other changes.3
The elections represented not only the most recent in a long 
series of blows to labor unions, but perhaps portended things to come 
as well. 4 The trend seemed undeniable.  Long before the 2012 
special elections, it was widely acknowledged that union influence 
was declining.5 By 2012, union membership was at a ninety-seven-
* John Stanley is a third-year student at Pepperdine University School of 
Law.
1 See Brian Montopoli, Scott Walker Wins Wisconsin Recall Election, CBS
NEWS (June 5, 2012, 9:03 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-
57447954-503544/scott-walker-wins-wisconsin-recall-election/.
2 The reforms were not directed solely at local public unions, but union 
representatives opposed the actions and vowed to fight the reforms in court.  See 
Catherine Saillant & Tony Perry, 2 Big Cities OK Cuts to Worker Pension Costs,
L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/ 2012/jun/07/local/la-me-
pensions-20120607.
3 In San Jose, city workers may now choose between increasing the 
amount they pay into their pension fund to 13% from 5%í11% and accepting a 
plan with reduced benefits.  Id. San Diego eliminated defined benefit pensions for 
new hires and adopted a 401k retirement plan.  Id.
4 David Kocieniewski, Unions, at Center of Wisconsin Recall Vote, Suffer 
a New Setback in Its Outcome, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2012, at A17 (noting that, 
among its various impacts, Walker’s reelection will likely embolden politicians 
elsewhere to take similar actions and hurt union recruiting in the future).
5 See PETER FAIRBROTHER & GERARD GRIFFIN, CHANGING PROSPECTS 
FOR TRADE UNIONISM: COMPARISONS BETWEEN SIX COUNTRIES 1 (Peter 
Fairbrother & Gerard Griffin eds., 2002) (acknowledging “massively” declining 
union membership in the 1980s and 1990s); MICHAEL D. YATES, WHY UNIONS 
MATTER í GHG FDWDORJXLQJ WKHSROLWLFDO DQGHFRQRPLFFKDOOHQJHV
modern unions face); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, The Wisconsin Union Fight 
Isn’t About Benefits. It’s About Labor’s Influence, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2011), 
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year low.6 Popular defeats at the ballot box could only confirm the 
fears of organized labor and its supporters that the influence of 
unions, both public and private, waned.7
Adding insult (and more injury) to injury, a mere three weeks 
after their high profile electoral losses, public unions were delivered 
another jolt by the Supreme Court in the form of Knox v. Service 
Employees International Union, Local 1000.8 The Knox decision 
effectively limits government unions’ ability to raise money for
future political expenditures by prohibiting “special assessments” on 
nonmembers without their consent. 9 This note will offer a brief 
history of public sector unions in America and introduce the reader to 
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and its role as a 
political player.  It will then lay the legal foundation on which Knox
rests and examine the Knox decision itself.  This note concludes that 
Knox is a significant event in the long-term decline of organized 
public sector labor, which is bound to dwindle along with unionized 
labor generally.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/03/04/AR201103040
6264.html (arguing that powerful forces are succeeding in their attempts to 
“destroy [organized labor’s] remaining clout”).  
6 Adam Davidson, Organize This, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., Feb. 3, 
2013, at MM14.
7 The passage of the Wisconsin bill resulted in large-scale protests at the 
statehouse in Madison.  Demonstrators famously “occupied” the capitol building 
before legislators passed the law, leading police to remove dozens of people and 
lock down the building. See Jonathon M. Seidl, Capitol Chaos: Police Drag 
Protestors from Wis. Statehouse, THE BLAZE (Mar. 10, 2011, 1:56 PM), 
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2011/03/10/capitol-chaos-police-drag-protesters-
from-wis-capitol/ (discussing an embedded local news video that displays and 
discusses the locked down Wisconsin Statehouse).  The bill was so controversial 
that Wisconsin’s Democratic state senators fled to Illinois to deny Republicans the 
necessary quorum of twenty members in order to vote.  See Jeff Mayers,
Democrats Flee Wisconsin to Protest Union Curbs, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2011/02/18/us-wisconsin-protests-
idUSTRE71H01920110218. California’s November 2012 ballot propositions 30 
and 32 and their significance will be considered later.  See generally Proposition 
2012 Cheat Sheet: California’s Nov. 6 Election, KCET, 
http://www.kcet.org/news/ballotbrief/ballot-measures/california-propositions-
guide-2012-cheat-sheet.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) (providing information on 
propositions 30 and 32).
8 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
9 See infra Part III (discussing such special assessments and their legality 
at the heart of Knox).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Unions in the United States
Workers in the United States have organized to pursue their 
interests in a unified manner since the early nineteenth century.10 For 
example, American shoemakers attempted to create “closed shops”11
as early as 1806.12 The 1935, the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA)13 officially gave workers the right to form and join unions 
and “obligated employers to bargain collectively with unions selected 
by a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.”14
The NLRA did not apply to government entities or their employees, 
however.15 Public unions are a more recent phenomenon.16
In 1958, Wisconsin, the state now leading the effort to 
diminish public union influence, was the first jurisdiction to allow 
government workers to unionize. 17 President John F. Kennedy’s 
Executive Order 10988 granted federal employees the right to form 
unions in 1962.18 Many states and municipalities soon followed the 
10 See YATES, supra note 5, at 35–37.
11 A closed shop arrangement exists where only union members are 
allowed to work at a given shop.  Id. at 36.
12 Id.
13 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012) (also commonly known as the Wagner 
Act).
14 The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD,
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2013).
15 Government entities are not considered employees under the terms of 
the Wagner Act.  Paul Moreno, How Public Unions Became So Powerful, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:55 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444017504577645550224040874.
html?mod=wsj_Opinion_leadTop.
16 Traditionally, the idea of public sector unionization was viewed with 
hostility.  Id.  Even presidents known for their progressive views like Woodrow 
Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt were strongly opposed to an organized government 
workforce.  Id.
17 Id.
18 Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. § 521 (1959–1963).  Unlike private 
sector (and some state and local government) unions, most federal government 
unions cannot collectively bargain over wages and benefits, and cannot go on 
strike.  Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker Says Most Federal Employees Do Not Have 
Collective Bargaining for Benefits or Pay, POLITIFACT,
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federal government’s lead.19 While union membership overall has 
steadily declined since the 1950s,20 public union membership has 
trended upward since at least the 1970s. 21 By 2012, the union 
membership rate was more than five times greater among public 
sector workers than among their private sector counterparts—35.9% 
to 6.6%, respectively. 22 However, since 2009, public union 
membership has been shrinking as well.23
B. SEIU, Political Player
With over one million state and local government members, 
SEIU is the second largest public employee union in the nation.24
Over 350,000 of those members are in California, where Local 1000 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2011/mar/02/scottwalker/wisconsin-gov-scott-walker-says-most-
federal-emplo/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).  They can, however, negotiate “working 
conditions,” which can include a wide range of issues from scheduling and 
vacation time to promotion practices.  Id.
19 Moreno, supra note 15.
20 FAIRBROTHER & GRIFFIN, supra note 5, at 4.
21 Review & Outlook, The Public-Union Ascendancy, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 
2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703837004575013424060649464.
html.
22 Economic News Release: Union Members Summary, DEP’T LAB.
BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 23, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.  Public sector union members 
also outnumbered their private counterparts 7.3 million to 7 million.  Combined, 
union workers accounted for 11.2% of the overall workforce.  Id.
23 Access to Historical Data for Union Membership, Table 3: Union 
Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry, 
Members of Unions, Government, DEP’T LAB. BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpslutab3.htm (select “Public Sector” row, 
“Member of Unions - Total” column; then click “Retrieve Data”) (last visited Oct. 
1, 2013).
24 Including private sector members, SEIU has over two million members.  
About SEIU, SEIU.ORG, http://www.seiu.org/our-union/ (last visited Feb. 9, 
2013).  American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME) is the nation’s largest public sector union with over 1.6 million active 
and retired members.  About AFSCME, AFSCME,
http://www.afscme.org/union/about (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
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of Knox is located.25 SEIU also claims to be the fastest growing 
union in North America.26
Along with its considerable size comes considerable political 
power.  In 2012 alone, SEIU contributed over $20 million to 
candidates, political groups (for example, the Democratic National 
Committee), or political action committees. 27 According to the 
Center for Responsive Politics, SEIU is the fifth largest political 
donor in the last twenty-three years, with over $50 million in direct 
political contributions.28 A White House visitor log released during 
President Obama’s first year in office revealed that former SEIU 
president, Andrew Stern, had visited twenty-two times, making him 
the most frequent White House guest.29 It was an attempt to flex 
political muscle that led to the dispute in Knox.30
III. LEGAL FOUNDATION
The Knox decision rests primarily on two prior cases dealing 
with public union fee collection and political expenditures.  Abood v. 
25 California has over 700,000 SEIU members when private sector 
workers are included.  SEIU in California, SEIU.ORG,
http://www.seiuca.org/about/seiu-in-california/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).  Local 
1000 spent around $4.3 million on political causes in 2012, mostly to defeat 
Proposition 32.  See What SEIU Local 1000 Spent on Politics This Year, THE 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 27, 2012), http://blogs.sacbee.com/the_state_worker/ 
2012/11/seiu-local-1000s-political-action.html.
26 About SEIU, supra note 24.
27 Summary of SEIU Contributions, Lobbying, and Spending Data,
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL.,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000077 (last visited Mar. 
17, 2013).
28 Top All-Time Donors, 1989–2012, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL.,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/list.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).  AFSCME 
came in second overall with over $68 million in political contributions.  Id. These 
numbers do not include the tens of millions of dollars spent to directly influence 
elections, i.e., not donated to candidates or other political organizations.  About 
Rankings, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/include/rankings_pop.php (last visited Mar. 17, 
2013).
29 Susan Davis, SEIU’s Stern Tops White House Visitor List, WALL ST. J.
BLOGS (Oct. 30, 2009, 6:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/10/30/seius-
stern-tops-white-house-visitor-list/.
30 Id.
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Detroit Board of Education31 acknowledged the First Amendment 
issues inherent in public union political contributions, but maintained 
that agency shop arrangements 32 were permissible under the 
Constitution.33 Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson34
clarified the requirements that must be followed by unions in order to 
collect regular fees from nonmembers without violating their rights.35
A. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education
Nonunion teachers challenged a Michigan law36 specifically 
allowing for agency shops whereby nonmembers would pay the 
equivalent of union dues despite their desire to refrain from 
membership.37 The Court took the case to determine whether such an 
arrangement “violates the constitutional rights of government 
employees who object to public-sector unions as such or to various 
union activities financed by the compulsory service fees.”38
Abood itself rests upon the reasoning in two prior labor 
decisions: Railway Employes’ [sic] Department v. Hanson, 39 and 
Machinists v. Street.40 Together, the cases stand for the proposition 
that employees may be compelled to contribute to expenses incurred 
by the union representing a shop in the bargaining process, but that 
use of the contributions is restricted by the First Amendment.41
The Court began by declining to take a different course in 
Abood than it had in Hanson or Street merely because the employer 
31 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
32 Id. at 211.  An agency shop is one that employs both union and 
nonunion workers, but a union bargains on behalf of all employees.  Id.
Nonmembers pay chargeable expenses to help defray the costs of collective 
bargaining.  Id.
33 Id.  The nature of the First Amendment issues are discussed infra in Part 
III.A.
34 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
35 Id.
36 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.210(1)(c) (1970).
37 Abood, 431 U.S. at 211.
38 Id. Under the agreement, new teachers would have sixty days in which 
to pay the required amount to the union or be subject to discharge.  Id. at 212.
39 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
40 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
41 Abood, 431 U.S. at 217–20.
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was the state itself.42 Notably, the union shop at issue in Hanson was 
considered “to result from governmental action.43 The constitutional 
constraints on a government employee union were to be analyzed in 
the same fashion as in the prior cases dealing with private sector 
unions.44
The Court was similarly unmoved by the plaintiff’s 
contention that “collective bargaining in the public sector is 
inherently ‘political’ and thus requires a different result under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.”45 After noting that it is indeed 
political, rather than financial, pressure that primarily functions to 
check government employers in the collective bargaining process, the 
Court determined that such a distinction did not alter the calculus 
determining the legality of the fee arrangement as a whole.46 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Stewart bluntly stated, “The differences 
between public- and private-sector collective bargaining simply do 
not translate into differences in First Amendment rights.”47
That said, there are constitutional limitations on how a union 
may spend fee money collected from nonmembers. 48 The First 
Amendment prohibits government unions from compelling 
nonmembers from whom they receive fees to subsidize non-
bargaining expenditures with which they disagree as a condition of 
42 Id. at 224.  Discussing the congressional intent behind the federal labor 
laws, the Court pointed out, “The desirability of labor peace is no less important in 
the public sector, nor is the risk of ‘free riders’ any smaller.”  Id.
43 Id. at 226.
44 See id. at 229–30 (“Public employees are not basically different from 
private employees . . . .  The uniqueness of public employment is not in the 
employees nor in the work performed; the uniqueness is in the special character of 
the employer.”).  In other words, the fact that the employer is a state actor is not 
germane to the analysis of the rights of the employee or the union, both of whom
remain private actors.
45 Id. at 227.
46 Id. at 229.  The Court pointed out that the free speech concerns of both 
private and public employees are essentially the same, so their interests ought to be 
given the same weight regardless of the status of their employers.  Id.
47 Id. at 232.  Justice Powell, whose concurrence was joined by Justice 
Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger, would have made a greater distinction 
between public and private employers than did the majority.  See id. at 245–60 
(Powell, J., dissenting).
48 See, e.g., id. at 235–36.
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employment.49 Money spent in furtherance of political or ideological 
causes must be derived from contributions by employees who “do not 
object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing 
so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental 
employment.”50 Abood thus established the broad outlines of the 
later agency shop cases:  agency shops are permissible, but unions 
cannot spend a nonmember’s fees on political or ideological goals 
without his consent.  Hudson would clarify the methods for assuring 
that unions did not violate their nonmembers’ rights.
B. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson
After the Illinois legislature authorized public unions within 
the state to implement the agency shop arrangement held to be 
constitutional in Abood, the Chicago Board of Education and the 
Chicago Teachers Union quickly began requiring nonmember 
teachers to contribute fees via paycheck deductions.51 In an attempt 
to satisfy the constitutional requirement of “preventing compulsory 
subsidization of ideological activity by employees who object thereto 
without restricting the Union’s ability to require every employee to 
contribute to the cost of collective-bargaining activities,” 52 the 
teachers’ union created a procedure for dealing with objections by 
nonmembers.53
Initially, the union made a determination of what percentage 
of its expenses was accrued on account of causes “germane to its 
duties as collective-bargaining agent.”54 The union calculated that 
95% of its total costs was the legitimate, “proportionate share” 
chargeable to nonmembers.55 No objections could be made prior to 
49 Id. at 234.  Forced contributions are every bit as much a constitutional 
violation as preventing a voluntary contribution.  Id. at 235.  In addition to 
contributing to collective bargaining, nonmembers must also help defray costs 
related to contract administration and grievance adjustment.  Id. at 225–26.
50 Id. at 236.
51 Chic. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 294 
(1986).
52 Id. at 302 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 237).
53 Id. at 296.
54 Id. at 294 (quoting Ellis v. Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984)).
55 Id. at 295–96.  This estimate was made based on financial records from 
the previous year.  The actual amount of political or ideological expenditures was 
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the collection of the fee.56 If a teacher objected after the fee was 
assessed, the procedure provided that the teacher alert the president 
of the union in writing within thirty days. 57 Then, the union’s 
executive committee would consider the objection.  If the 
committee’s decision were appealed, an executive board would 
reconsider.58 As a last resort, the union would pay for arbitration of 
the dispute.59 If the objector won at any level, he or she was entitled 
to a refund and a reduction of future paycheck deductions.60 Hudson
dealt with whether such a procedure could survive First Amendment 
scrutiny.61 The Court found that it did not.62
The first problem the Court saw with the union’s plan was 
that its only remedy was a rebate. 63 A return of funds after an 
erroneous deduction did not avoid the risk that nonmembers’ fees 
would be used, even temporarily, for unconstitutional purposes.64
Next, the Court discussed the inadequacy of the information given to 
nonmembers regarding the calculation of their proportionate share.65
Lastly, the Court specified a requirement that employee objections be 
4.6%, but the union rounded to 5% to provide the nonmembers a “cushion.”  Id. at 
295.
56 Id. at 296. 
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 304.  The teachers’ union in Hudson also argued that such a 
procedure was not in violation of the Constitution because it placed the plaintiff’s 
money in escrow pending the outcome of the case, and therefore, their fees could 
not have been used against their wishes.  Id. at 299.  However, for purposes of 
precedential value, the procedure itself is much more significant to Knox, and this 
note therefore focuses on the procedure.  See infra Part IV. 
62 Hudson, 475 U.S. at 301, 310.
63 Id. at 305.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 306.  While the burden of objecting is on the worker, an employee 
must be given notice of how his share of expenses was calculated if he is to make 
an informed objection. See id. at 306–07.  This would come to be colloquially 
known as “Hudson notice.”  See, e.g., Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 
1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2285 (2012).  Significantly, the Court made clear that the 
method used to determine the fees in this case, namely estimates based on financial 
statements from the previous year, was acceptable given the difficulties of making 
precise predictions regarding costs. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307 n.18.
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heard in an “expeditious, fair, and objective manner.”66 While an 
objection is pending, the amount in controversy should be held in 
escrow.67 In sum, a constitutional nonmember union fee must be 
assessed only after adequate explanation of its grounds is subject to 
prompt challenge before a neutral authority, and should be placed in 
escrow pending the outcome of the hearing.68
Thus, in light of Abood and Hudson, a basic framework 
emerges.  Government employees and employers may create agency 
shops represented by unions in collective bargaining.69 The union 
representing the shop may require nonunion employees to pay a fee 
for chargeable expenses (i.e., those related to the duties of the union 
as collective bargainer).70 However, the union may not spend the 
money assessed to a nonmember for political or ideological purposes 
absent the worker’s consent.71 Finally, upon a worker’s reasonable 
objection, the objector’s fees must be placed in escrow and the 
worker’s claim must be promptly heard by an impartial decision 
maker.72 This is the lens through which the Supreme Court would 
view the dispute in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, 
Local 1000.
IV. KNOX V. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 
1000
A. The Facts
Like Michigan and Illinois, California allows public 
employees to form agency shops.73 The practice of one such shop, 
66 Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307.  The Court noted that the system at issue was 
controlled, at all times, entirely by the union.  Id. The Court strongly implied that 
decisions regarding validity of nonmember payments should be determined by 
someone outside of the union.  See id. at 307–09.
67 Id. at 310.
68 Id.
69 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977). 
70 Id. at 217–20.
71 Hudson, 475 U.S. at 305.
72 Id. at 310.
73 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3502.5(a) (West 2010).
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SEIU Local 1000 (the Local), 74 was to charge all represented 
employees, whether union members or not, the full amount of union 
dues.75 If and when nonmembers objected to the assessment upon 
receiving Hudson notice, the union would only deduct the amount it 
calculated as chargeable expenses.76 The Local’s Hudson notice also 
contained a clause stating that the fee was “subject to increase at any 
time without further notice.”77
In June of 2005, then-California Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger called for a special election in November to vote on 
various government budget-cutting measures. 78 Public employee 
unions actively opposed the measures. 79 In order to fund its 
campaign against the ballot proposals, the Local instituted a “special 
assessment” in the amount of an additional 25% of regular fees on all 
employees the Local represented—after the thirty-day period for 
objecting to the Hudson notice had ended.80
74 SEIU Local 1000 is California’s largest state (government) employee 
union.  About Local 1000, SEIU LOCAL 1000, http://seiu1000.org/your-
union/about.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2013).  It represents 95,000 workers in nine 
“bargaining units” based on occupation categories.  Id.
75 See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2285 
(2012).
76 Id. For 2005, the year at issue, chargeable expenses were calculated at 
56.35% of full union dues.  Id.
77 Id.
78 See id.  Proposition 76, geared at controlling state spending, would have 
limited outlays from the state’s general and special funds to the level of the prior 
year plus an amount determined by average past increases.  Proposition 76: Key 
Issues and Fiscal Effects, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (Sept. 30, 
2005), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/prop_76/prop_76_093005.htm. The cap would 
have likely affected discretionary, but not entitlement spending.  See id.
79 See id. SEIU was primarily concerned about Propositions 75 and 76 
which respectively would have required unions to obtain employees affirmative 
consent in writing before charging them fees to fund political operations and given 
the governor power to reduce state spending on public employees.  Id. Public 
employee unions contributed nearly $10 million to oppose Governor 
Schwarzenegger’s proposals.  Id. (citing Carla Marinucci & John Wildermuth, 
Schwarzenegger Adds Prop. 75 to His Agenda, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 18, 2005, at A-
17, available at http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Schwarzenegger-adds-Prop-
75-to-his-agenda-2568986.php).
80 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285.  The total fee for most members after the 
additional 25% would be 1.25% of their monthly salary.  Id. at 2286.
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The notice of the fee increase specifically stated that the funds 
were an “Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political 
Fight-Back Fund” (the Fight-Back Fund).81 The Local went on to 
make clear that “[t]he Fund [would] not be used for regular costs of 
the union—such as office rent, staff salaries, or routine equipment 
replacement, etc.” 82 The money would instead be spent on 
television, radio, direct mail advertising, voter registration and 
education, and a get-out-the-vote campaign.83 Employees were not 
given an opportunity to opt-out of the special assessment.84 A class 
action was filed on behalf of 28,000 nonunion employees upon 
whom the special assessment was imposed.85
B. District Court
The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff 
nonmembers as to the question of whether the Local’s special 
assessment violated the nonmembers’ First Amendment rights.86 The 
court found that the plaintiffs did not receive adequate notice of the 
fee increase, and failure to object to the original Hudson notice did 
not constitute consent to the special assessment.87 The appropriate 
remedy, according to the district court, was new notice giving 
nonmembers forty-five days in which to opt-out of paying into the 
Fight-Back Fund.88 Those who objected were to be issued a “refund 
of the nonchargeable portion of the [special assessment], with 
interest.”89
81 Id.
82 Id. (quoting the Local’s fee increase proposal) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
83 Id.
84 Id. Employees who originally objected upon receipt of the annual 
Hudson notice were only assessed 56.35% of the special assessment.  Id.
85 Id.
86 See Knox v. Westly, No. 2:05-cv-02198-MCE-KJM, 2008 WL 850128, 
at *12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev'd sub nom. Knox v. Cal. State Emps. Ass'n, 
Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. Knox v. Cal. State 
Emps. Ass'n, Local 1000, 692 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2012).
87 Id. at *10–11.
88 See id. at *12.
89 Id. at *10.  The court was unimpressed by the defendant union’s 
argument that Hudson dealt with regular annual fees and not a special assessment.  
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C. The Court of Appeals
A divided three-judge panel reversed the ruling of the district 
court.90 According to the Ninth Circuit panel, Hudson established a 
balancing test for determining the adequacy of union notice.91 In 
addition to “balancing of the ‘right’ of the union to collect an agency 
fee against the First Amendment rights of nonmembers”,92 the Ninth 
Circuit also inquired into whether the system of notice and 
subsequent remedial procedures took proper account of “the union, 
the [public employer] and nonmember employees.” 93 Under this 
analysis, the court concluded that the Local did not violate Hudson.94
The majority took issue with the district court’s failure to 
account for the difficulty of predicting future expenses under the 
normal method of chargeable expense calculations.95 After all, any 
mistakes in the chargeability determination will necessarily average 
out the year after they are made when the current year’s accounting is 
factored in.96 The panel maintained that the district court’s remedy 
of renewed notice when an out-of-the-ordinary fee increase was to be 
imposed would be unworkable for a union.97
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Wallace claimed that the majority 
misconstrued the Hudson test as well as the nature of the union’s 
claim to nonmembers’ money. 98 His assertions would soon be 
echoed by the Supreme Court, which took the case to decide 
See id. at *11.  According to the court, such a literal reading of Hudson amounted 
to using a loophole to subvert the Constitution’s First Amendment protections.  See 
id. (“[N]o self-asserted loophole will allow Defendants to avoid the Constitution.”).
90 See Knox v. Cal. State Emps. Ass'n, Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115, 1117 
(9th Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 
S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
91 Id. at 1117, 1119–20.  
92 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2291.
93 Knox, 628 F.3d at 1120 (alteration in original) (quoting Grunwald v. 
San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 1370, 1376 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
94 Id.
95 See id. at 1121.
96 See id.
97 Id. at 1122.
98 Id. at 1127–28 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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“whether the First Amendment allows a public-sector union to 
require objecting nonmembers to pay a special fee for the purpose of 
financing the union’s political and ideological activities.”99
V. KNOX AT THE SUPREME COURT
A. Alito for the Majority
1. Mootness
The Local may have signaled that it anticipated a reversal of 
the Ninth Circuit by its conduct before the Knox case was argued in 
front of the Supreme Court in January of 2012.  After the Court 
granted certiorari, the union offered refunds to the class members and 
then moved to dismiss the case as moot.100 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Alito explained that a case will generally not be dismissed on 
ground of mootness when doing so would allow one of the parties to 
immediately resume the disputed conduct without being 
sanctioned. 101 Furthermore, a live controversy existed as to the 
adequacy of the notice of the proposed refunds.102 Thus, the Court 
proceeded to the merits.103
2. Compulsory Subsidization of Speech
Justice Alito began by reaffirming the concept that free 
speech includes being able to choose “what not to say.”104 Likewise, 
freedom of association “presupposes a freedom not to associate.”105
Justice Alito then drew a connection between compelled speech and 
association and compelled funding of speech.106 Drawing on United 
99 See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 
(2012).
100 Id. at 2287.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 2288.
104 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of 
N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105 Id. (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
106 Id.
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States v. United Foods, Inc., 107 he laid out the two-part test for 
upholding the compulsory subsidization of private speech.108 “First, 
there must be a comprehensive regulatory scheme involving a 
‘mandated association’ among those who are required to pay the 
subsidy.”109 Next, “compulsory fees can be levied only insofar as 
they are a ‘necessary incident’ of the ‘larger regulatory purpose 
which justified the required association.’”110 According to Justice 
Alito, the union-nonmember relationship is not one in which forced
subsidization of speech can constitutionally take place.111 Therefore, 
nonmembers are entitled to full First Amendment protection.112
3. Hudson Notice and the First Amendment
Justice Alito proceeded to state that, “unions have no 
constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees.”113
In fact, he asserted that the whole notion of an opt-out system—as 
opposed to a system whereby nonmember employees would have to 
affirmatively consent to a paycheck deduction for union expenses—
which has become the norm, came about only because of a “historical 
accident.”114 Justice Alito made clear the majority’s concern that 
opt-out fee arrangements for nonmembers push the acceptable limits 
of the First Amendment.115 Given the tenuous grip on legality of 
regular union fee collection, the special assessment at issue certainly 
could not stand.116
107 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
108 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289.
109 Id. (quoting United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 414 (2001)).
110 Id. (quoting United Foods, 533 U.S. at 414).
111 See id.
112 See id.
113 Id. at 2291 (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 
185 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114 Id. at 2290.  Justice Alito detailed union fee cases from International 
Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), to Chicago Teachers Union, 
Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), and submitted that acceptance of opt-
out systems would not have arisen but for unique factual circumstances in the 
precedential cases.  See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290. 
115 See id. at 2291.
116 See id.
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In light of the fact that some plaintiffs did not object to the 
original Hudson notice, the majority “[saw] no justification for the 
union’s failure to provide a fresh Hudson notice.” 117 The Court 
reasoned that informed consent to union fees could only be given if 
employees had fair notice of how their contributions would be 
used. 118 Under normal circumstances, yearly Hudson notice is 
sufficient because nonmembers will have a “fair opportunity” to 
consider the use of their fee.119 However, when there is a special 
assessment, the rationale for allowing the yearly opt-out 
disappears.120 The Court noted that this case provided a particularly 
illustrative example of the potential consequences of ineffective 
Hudson notice because of the nature of the contested ballot 
propositions.121 The union was actively opposing Proposition 75, 
which, if passed, would have instituted an opt-in system for 
nonmembers who wished to contribute to the Local’s political 
goals.122 In effect, the Local was forcing nonmembers to contribute 
to a campaign against their own financial interests.123
The Local argued for the adequacy under the First 
Amendment of its existing opt-out framework.124 Its main contention 
was that nonmembers who would have objected to the special 
assessment would be compensated by opting out upon receipt of the 
next Hudson notice the following year.125 This is because the union, 
upon accounting for the political use of the special assessment, would 
lower the percentage of normal members’ dues that were attributable 
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 303) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Additionally, the logic behind annual Hudson notice is based on the 
assumption that the proportion of chargeable to nonchargeable expenses will be 
relatively constant.  Id. at 2293.
120 See id. at 2292.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See id. The Court pointed out that it would have been easy for the 
Local to put its notice of the impending fee increase in the form of a Hudson notice 
and allow nonmembers to object.  Id.
124 See id.
125 Id.
874 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-2
to chargeable expenses. 126 That is to say, nonmembers would 
eventually break even.
The Court disagreed that the potential for breaking even in 
terms of chargeable expenses provided sufficient First Amendment 
protection to nonmembers.127 It reasoned that such a system would 
be tantamount to a compulsory loan by nonmembers, the proceeds of 
which could be used to fund projects they found repugnant. 128
Justice Alito repeated the Court’s concern with even the existing opt-
out framework and explained that any further First Amendment 
impingement was simply unacceptable.129
Not only was the Local’s notice ineffective as it concerned 
the plaintiff nonmembers who had not opted out after receiving the 
regular annual Hudson notice, but the union also violated the First 
Amendment rights of the nonmembers who had opted out in the first 
instance.130 The Local charged objectors the same percentage of the 
special assessment as it charged of the annual assessment: 56.35%.131
Given that the union acknowledged that the new fees were going 
specifically to support a political effort, however, there was no reason 
to suppose the chargeable portion, if any, of the special assessment 
would be anywhere near that number.132
The Local suggested that the nonmembers who objected at 
the outset, and thus had paid only 56.35% of the special assessment, 
actually came out ahead in terms of the total fees assessed to them.133
As it turned out, the union claimed, the actual amount of chargeable 
expenses for 2005 was at least 66.26%.134 Therefore, those members 
who paid 56.35% of both the original and special assessment paid 
less than they could legally have been required to pay.
Justice Alito offered two reasons why this reasoning did not
persuade the Court.135 First, the majority objected to the expansive 
126 See id.
127 Id. at 2292–93.
128 Id.
129 See id. at 2293, 2295.
130 See id. at 2293.
131 Id.
132 See id.
133 Id. at 2294.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 2294–95.
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view the Local took of what constituted chargeable expenses.136 For 
example, the union assumed that expenditures towards “lobbying . . . 
the electorate” and defeating Proposition 76 were properly counted as 
chargeable expenses and thus deductible from nonmembers’ pay.137
The Court countered that such a broad definition of what could be 
considered a chargeable expense would essentially “eviscerate the 
limitation on the use of compulsory fees to support unions’ 
controversial political activities.”138
Second, the Court explained that, unless the amount of 
chargeable expenses could be accurately predicted (which the Local 
contended was impossible), then the union had an obligation to err on 
the side of not charging nonmembers up front.139 The rationale for 
this rule is that if the nonmember is overcharged, there is a risk that 
the nonmember’s First Amendment rights will be violated by using 
that money to subsidize speech with which he or she disagrees.140
On the other hand, if the nonmember is undercharged, there is no risk 
of any party’s rights being infringed.141 The risk associated with 
under or overpayment should fall on the union—who will make up 
the difference upon the next assessment—not the nonmember.142
The majority ended by requiring unions both to “provide a 
fresh Hudson notice” and to receive the affirmative consent of 
nonmembers before imposing a special assessment.143 This result 
was compelled by the already substantial impingement on First 
Amendment rights by virtue of current opt-out systems. 144 Any 
further offense to nonmembers’ free speech rights would be 
136 Id. at 2294.
137 See id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 51, Knox v. Service 
Employees Intern Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012) (No. 10–1121), 2011 
WL 5908951, at *51) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Local argued that 
the opposition to Proposition 76 should count as chargeable because, if it passed, 
the measure would have undermined the union’s effectiveness as a collective 
bargainer.  Id.
138 Id. at 2295.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 Id.
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 2296.
144 See id. at 2295.
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intolerable.145 Thus, the general rule that individuals should not be 
required to subsidize private speech must prevail.146
B. Justice Sotomayor’s Concurrence147
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg joined the Court’s judgment 
because they agreed that the Local did not comply with Hudson since 
no new notice was issued before the additional fee was assessed.148
However, Justice Sotomayor explained that, in her opinion, the 
holding should have ended there.149 She pointed out that neither 
party specifically asked the Court to rule on whether an opt-in 
provision was necessary.150 She also referred to the Court’s own 
rules for the proposition that the Court should only consider 
questions “set out in the petition.”151 Furthermore, no prior Supreme 
Court case had ever brought up the possibility that the common opt-
out method of fee assessment was inadequate.152 Since neither party 
thought such a holding was necessary to resolve the case, the Court 
should not have gone out of its way to decide the issue.153
145 See id.
146 Id.
147 See id. at 2296–99 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg 
joined Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence.  See id. at 2296.
148 Id. at 2296–97.
149 See id. at 2296, 2297.
150 See id. 
151 Id. at 2297 (quoting SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a) (2013)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).
152 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  The majority countered that no case 
had yet dealt with the issue of a special, as opposed to annual, assessment, and that 
this distinction is what led to the need for the opt-in provision.  See id. at 2296 n.9.
153 See id. at 2297–98.  Justice Sotomayor turned Justice Alito’s words 
against him by quoting his opinion in NASA v. Nelson: “appellate courts do not sit 
as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of 
legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.” Id. at 2298 
(quoting NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 757 n.10 (2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).
The majority contended that deciding the case on the assumption that an 
opt-out regime was constitutionally permissible would be akin to presuming any
other unconstitutional proposition to be valid unless it was set out in the petition.  
Id. at 2296 n.9.  Justice Sotomayor responded that, if the constitutional issue was 
not properly framed, then the Court should not have granted certiorari, or, 
alternatively, asked for supplemental briefing.  Id. at 2298 n.2.
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Justice Sotomayor went on to assert that the majority’s 
position was unclear in addition to being unwarranted.154 She posited 
a series of questions to which she found the Court’s new rule lacking 
an answer. 155 She pondered, “What procedures govern this new 
world of fee collection?”156
But perhaps Justice Sotomayor and Justice Ginsburg’s 
greatest concern was that the language used by the majority strongly 
suggested that the line of union fee cases from Street to Hudson “may 
not long endure.”157 The concurrence accused the Court of bringing 
up First Amendment issues not considered by the parties, “cast[ing] 
serious doubt on longstanding precedent”—a rare move absent 
prompting from concerned parties.158
C. Justice Breyer’s Dissent159
1. The Opt-Out System
Justice Breyer’s dissent focused on the statement in Hudson 
that “the Union cannot be faulted for calculating its fee on the basis 
of its expenses during the preceding year.” 160 According to the 
dissent, that was exactly what the Local did in this case.161 Justice 
Breyer pointed to the fact that, since Hudson was decided, employers 
and unions have relied on the idea that fees collected by unions could 
be based on an accounting of chargeable expenses made in the prior 
year.162 As he viewed the issue, the existing opt-out framework was 
sufficient to protect nonmember workers while compensating the 
union for its expenses incurred as collective bargainer.163
154 See id. at 2298.
155 Id. at 2298–99.
156 Id. at 2299.
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 2299–2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Kagan joined 
Justice Breyer’s dissent.  See id. at 2299.
160 Id. at 2299 (quoting Chic. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 
U.S. 292, 307 n.18 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 2299–2300.
163 See id. at 2300.
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Justice Breyer meticulously explained how the yearly 
accounting involved in the opt-out method operated to provide fair 
results to nonmembers over the long term.164 By capping a year’s 
fees at the amount of the prior year’s actual chargeable expenses, 
“what the objecting nonmembers lose on the swings they will gain on 
the roundabouts.” 165 For Justice Breyer, this system, while 
imperfect, is workable and comports with the First Amendment—
which is to say that it complies with the requirements of Abood and 
Hudson.166
2. The Special Assessment
Justice Breyer analyzed the constitutionality of the special 
assessment separately as to the nonmembers who objected to the 
initial 2005 Hudson notice and as to the nonmembers who did not 
initially object.167 He concluded that the special assessment did not 
violate the First Amendment rights of the initial objectors because, as 
described above, they ended up paying less in retrospect than the 
union was actually entitled to charge them.168 Justice Breyer also 
claimed that, even if it had not been the case that these nonmembers 
underpaid for the year in question, he would still find no 
constitutional violation in determining their chargeable percentage 
based on the prior year’s financial statements.169 This is due to the 
fact that, notwithstanding the Local’s admission that none of the 
special assessment would be chargeable in this particular instance, 
projecting the amount of special assessments that will end up being 
chargeable will almost always be a very difficult task.170 The logic 
and long-run fairness of the current system of using the prior year as 
the determinant of the current year’s fees becomes manifest given 
164 Id. at 2301.
165 Id.
166 See id. at 2300–03.  Justice Breyer acknowledged that the possibility 
that an objecting nonmember’s fee contribution will help pay for a non-chargeable 
political expenditure is always present.  Id. at 2301.  “Nonetheless this kind of 
system enjoys an offsetting administrative virtue,” in that it is based on audited 
accounts and not predictions.  Id.
167 Id. at 2302.
168 Id.
169 See id. at 2302–03.
170 See id.
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such a complicated endeavor.171 The fact that, in this case, the Local 
claimed that most if not all of the special assessment would go 
toward a political campaign was unfortunate because it is not likely 
to be representative of the vast majority of cases where special 
assessments are levied. 172 In the event that expenditures are 
misclassified or improperly imposed, nonmembers have at their 
disposal procedures for challenging the chargeability of expenses.173
Justice Breyer contended that this is sufficient to vindicate objecting 
nonmembers’ First Amendment rights.174
According to Justice Breyer, nonmembers who failed to 
initially object upon receipt of the annual Hudson notice have a 
stronger case than their counterparts to object to the imposition of the 
special assessment.175 Justice Breyer claimed that this is because 
these nonmembers will be forced to pay the entire special 
assessment, not just some percentage of it. 176 Nonetheless, he 
argued, the same administrative difficulties that apply to determining 
chargeable expenses prior to a post-expenditure accounting make a 
compelling case that even initial non-objectors should not be allowed 
to later object to a special assessment.177
3. The Likelihood of a First Amendment Violation
Justice Breyer was convinced that, in most cases, actual 
deprivation of First Amendment rights is unlikely to occur.178 He 
171 See id. at 2303.
172 See id. Justice Breyer echoed Justice Sotomayor’s concern that a 
nonmember may be able to object to any special assessment, even one strictly for 
additional chargeable expenses.  Id. He argued that nothing in the majority opinion 
would prevent such an outcome.  Id.
173 See id. at 2304.  If an objecting nonmember is not satisfied with the 
union’s determinations, the union will pay for arbitration before the American 
Arbitration Association.  Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id.
176 Id.  Presumably, this would increase the likelihood that nonmembers 
who did not initially object would end up paying for more than their share of a 
given year’s chargeable expenses.  This, in turn, would increase the possibility that 
they would subsidize some union projects with which they disagree.
177 Id. at 2304–05.  For example, should an initial non-objector (or an 
initial objector, for that matter) be allowed to object to a special assessment brought 
on by unexpected, but perfectly legitimate chargeable expenses?  See id. at 2305.
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explained his reasoning as follows.  A regular (usually annual) 
opportunity to object to paying the equivalent of full dues provides 
the nonmember with adequate protection against the unconstitutional 
use of his funds for political purposes.179 Employees are well aware 
that unions spend money in furtherance of political positions. 180
Nonmembers who generally oppose the union’s politics will usually 
object at each given opportunity.181 Of those who would only choose 
to object to special assessments, there are likely many who would do 
so not for ideological reasons, but merely because they wish to save 
money.182 Objection on financial, rather than free speech grounds, is 
not subject to constitutional protection. 183 Even if an objection 
would have been based on First Amendment concerns, the would-be 
objector can always make an objection the next year, at which point 
his or her lessened fees will be based on the spending in the prior 
year that was actually objected to.184
4. The Court Entering the Political Realm
Finally, Justice Breyer criticized the Court for wading into a 
hotly contested political issue, especially given that its holding was 
not specifically requested or argued by either party.185 He expressed 
his concern that the majority’s holding could be construed as 
pertaining to all nonmember union fees, not just special 
assessments.186 Justice Breyer concluded by agreeing with Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurrence insofar as it relates to the inappropriateness 
of taking on a constitutional issue without the “benefit of 
argument.”187 He made his concern known that “the opinion will 
play a central role in an ongoing, intense political debate.”188
178 See id. at 2305–06.
179 Id. at 2305.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 See id. 
184 See id. at 2306.
185 See id. at 2306–07.
186 Id. at 2306.
187 Id. at 2306–07.
188 Id. at 2306.
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VI. KNOX IN CONTEXT
A. Does Knox Change Anything?
The majority’s holding in Knox may seem unremarkable 
when one considers the legal ground on which it sits, i.e., Abood and 
Hudson.189 Given the pains the Court had taken to protect the First 
Amendment rights of nonmembers in the past when annual fees were 
being assessed, it should not be surprising that a special assessment 
for admittedly political purposes was subject to extreme 
skepticism.190 The majority was clearly more inclined to err on the 
side of overprotecting objecting nonmembers than ensuring that 
unions got every penny of contributions to which they were 
entitled.191
Indeed, one gets the sense reading the opinion that the 
holding in Knox is a foregone conclusion.192 As suggested above, 
even SEIU seemed to understand the futility of its position, as 
indicated by its suggested refund to the plaintiff class.193 The Court 
went so far as to admonish the Ninth Circuit by repeating, verbatim, a 
footnote from Hudson explaining that the goal of any fee collection 
system should be the minimization of the likelihood of First 
Amendment violations, as opposed to a balancing of employer, 
employee, and union interests.194 But if the answer appears clear 
given the precedent (Justice Breyer’s dissent notwithstanding), why 
hear the case at all?
189 See supra Part III.
190 Justice Breyer thought the fact the union informed employees that it 
intended to use the special assessment “camouflaged” the real problems, which 
dealt with administrative feasibility.  Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2303 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
191 See, e.g., id. at 2295 (majority opinion) (“Which side should bear [the 
risk of underpayment or overpayment]?  The answer is obvious: the side whose 
constitutional rights are not at stake.”).
192 Even the question the Court chose to consider seems to suggest the 
outcome: “In this case, we decide whether the First Amendment allows a public-
sector union to require objecting nonmembers to pay a special fee for the purpose 
of financing the union’s political and ideological activities.”  Id. at 2284. 
193 See id. at 2287.
194 Id. at 2291 n.3 (quoting Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 
475 U.S. 292, 303 n.11 (1986)).
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B. Why Hear the Case?
Two answers to this question are discernable from the 
opinion.  First, and most obviously, the Court chose to reverse what it 
considered an erroneous decision by the Ninth Circuit.195 Allowing a 
misreading of Hudson to persist as the law in a prominent circuit 
would place the First Amendment rights of nonmembers at a 
heightened risk—something this Court was unwilling to do.196
A more conspiratorial possibility is one that is hinted at in 
both Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence and Justice Breyer’s dissent: 
the Court is seeking to open the door to the possibility of requiring 
opt-in provisions for all collections of nonmember fees, not just for 
special assessments.197 The majority spoke more than once to what it 
saw as the dangerous proximity between opt-out systems and First 
Amendment violations.198 The Court’s language leaves no doubt as 
to the majority’s dislike of the current state of law regarding union 
collection of nonmember fees.  It is possible that the Court is paving 
the way for future challenges to the constitutionality of the traditional 
opt-out system for all nonmember contributions.
195 Id. at 2296.
196 See id. at 2295–96 (“First Amendment values [would be] at serious risk 
if the government [could] compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of 
citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that [the government] 
favors.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
197 See id. at 2299 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[W]hile the majority’s 
novel rule is, on its face, limited to special assessments and dues increases, the 
majority strongly hints that this line may not long endure.”); id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“The decision is particularly unfortunate given the fact that each 
reason the Court offers in support of its ‘opt-in’ conclusion seems in logic to apply, 
not just to special assessments, but to ordinary yearly fee charges as well.”).
198 See id. at 2291 (majority opinion) (“By authorizing a union to collect 
fees from nonmembers and permitting the use of an opt-out system for the 
collection of fees levied to cover nonchargeable expenses, our prior decisions 
approach, if they do not cross, the limit of what the First Amendment can 
tolerate.”); id. at 2293 (“Our cases have tolerated a substantial impingement on 
First Amendment rights by allowing unions to impose an opt-out requirement at 
all.”); id. at 2295 (“As we have noted, by allowing unions to collect any fees from 
nonmembers and by permitting unions to use opt-out . . . schemes when annual 
dues are billed, our cases have substantially impinged upon the First Amendment 
rights of nonmembers.”).
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C. The Larger Union Struggle
The question remains as to where Knox fits into the larger 
picture of the changing role of unions—especially public employee 
unions.199 Coming as it did on the heels of the union defeats in 
Wisconsin and California,200 it is easy to view Knox as a sign of the 
times, another step toward eventual irrelevance for organized labor.  
This interpretation may indeed be accurate, and would certainly 
please a number of the labor movement’s critics.201
But organized labor has its share of modern supporters, too.202
They argue, among other things that, “the decline of unionism is part 
199 Although the reasoning appears to apply to all unions and the 
nonmembers they represent, the Knox decision, by the terms of the question 
presented, applies only to public employee unions.  See id. at 2284.  The majority 
refers several times to public employee unions, but the Court’s analysis of United 
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001), early in the opinion suggests that 
the reasoning might apply to the forced subsidization of any speech.  Id. at 2289.  
Unlike the Abood decision, the Court in Knox does not attempt to reconcile any 
discrepancies that may exists in analyzing public versus private union fee 
collection from nonmembers.  See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 
229-30 (1977).  See generally Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277.
200 See supra Part I.
201 Labor has long had its share of critics.  See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN 
& JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 6 (1984) (“[Union] wage increases 
have harmful economic effects, reducing the national output and distorting the 
distributions of income.”); N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 629
(Jack W. Calhoun et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007) (“When a union raises wages above the 
equilibrium level, it raises the quantity of labor supplied and reduces the quantity of 
labor demanded, resulting in unemployment.”); Milton Friedman, Milton Friedman 
on Labor Unions – Free to Choose, YOUTUBE (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tefm8wxCQdg (arguing that unions can only 
increase wages for members by foreclosing opportunities to nonmembers, whereas 
increased wages due to market competition among employers comes at no one’s 
expense). 
202 See, e.g., FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 201, at 8 (“Collective rather 
than individual bargaining with an employer is necessary for effective voice at the 
workplace . . . .”); YATES, supra note 5, at 41 (“While the effect of unionization 
(with all other variables held constant) varies from group to group, it is always 
significantly positive. . . .  That unions improve the wages and benefits of workers 
is something all workers should know . . . .”); Michael Moore, Michael Moore: 
Autoworkers Union Built U.S. Middle Class, YOUTUBE (Dec. 4, 2008), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kE6e5HWH8II; Robert Reich, The Non Zero-
Sum Society, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2013, 7:40 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/union-membership 
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of a cycle that will inevitably swing back to favour [sic] 
unionization.”203 The November 2012 regular election in California 
would seem to support their theory—California ballot Propositions 
30 and 32, both steadfastly supported by union leadership, were 
settled in favor of organized labor.204 It would appear that, statewide, 
California sentiment generally is more in favor of, and more willing 
to finance, union labor than the municipalities of San Diego and San 
Jose.205
Proposition 30 increased some state taxes and prevented 
others from being cut.206 According to California Governor Jerry 
Brown, failure to pass the measure would have resulted in spending 
cuts that would have damaged public schools and diminished public 
safety. 207 Proposition 32 would have prevented unions from 
deducting money from members’ paychecks to be used for political 
purposes (essentially creating an opt-in system for all political 
contributions to unions from members and nonmembers alike) as 
well as banned contributions to political candidates by unions and 
corporations.208 Whether the November 2012 California election was 
rate_b_2572819.html (arguing that employees of large companies such as Wal-
Mart and McDonald’s should be unionized and that American law should be more 
favorable to organized labor).
203 FAIRBROTHER & GRIFFIN, supra note 5, at 11.
204 See Voters Protect Schools, Pass Prop. 30, Defeat 32, SEIU LOCAL 
521 (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.seiu521.org/2012/thank-you/ (thanking California 
voters for their willingness “to invest in our public schools” and defeating “a 
deceptive ballot measure aimed at silencing workers and their unions”).
205 See Saillant & Perry, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
206 See Official Voter Information Guide, Text of Proposed Laws for 
Proposition 30: “The Schools and Local Public Safety Protection Act of 2012”,
CAL. SEC’Y OF ST., 80–84, available at
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-v2.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2013).
207 Inojlt, Vote Yes on Proposition 30: Jerry Brown’s Budget Plan, DAILY 
KOS (Oct. 9, 2012, 11:12 PM), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/10/10/1142494/-Vote-Yes-on-Proposition-30-
Jerry-Brown-s-Budget-Plan.
208 CAL. SEC’Y OF ST., PROPOSITION 32, SECTION 2: “THE STOP SPECIAL 
INTEREST MONEY NOW ACT”, in OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: TEXT OF 
PROPOSED LAWS 80, 93–94 (2012), available at
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-v2.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2013).
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an outlier in an otherwise anti-union trend or the beginning of a 
reversal of organized labor’s fortunes remains to be seen. 
The long-term trends described in Part II do not bode well for 
unions generally, and as noted, even public sector unions have been 
on the decline since 2009. 209 Overall, it is fair to say that the 
twentieth century saw a rise and fall of organized labor in 
America.210 It may also prove true that, California’s November 2012 
election notwithstanding, recent political events will serve to 
embolden anti-union politicians and activists and lead them to push 
for more cost-cutting measures that limit union rights.211
D. The Cost of Unions
The dramatic increase in federal debt has been well 
publicized.212 Less well known is the dramatic increase in state debt 
in recent years.213 One method of getting state government budgets 
under control is to lower the costs of public payrolls.214 In the past 
year alone there have been budget-based legislative disputes between 
state governments and public employee unions in Michigan, 
Wisconsin, California, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, and 
Connecticut, to name a few.215 Budget constraints may prove the 
209 See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
210 See, e.g., FAIRBROTHER & GRIFFIN, supra note 5, at 200–03.
211 See, e.g., Kocieniewski, supra note 4; see also Times Topics-Organized 
Labor, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/organized_labor/ind
ex.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
212 See, e.g., Mary Kate Cary, No, Paul Krugman, Let’s Not ‘Kick that 
Can’, US NEWS (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/mary-kate-
cary/2013/02/08/paul-krugman-is-wrong-about-our-national-debt.
213 Total state debt as a percentage of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product has 
grown from 3.5% in 1960 to 7.5% in 2009.  US State Government Debt Since 1900,
U.S. GOV’T DEBT, http://www.usgovernmentdebt.us/state_debt (last visited Oct. 7, 
2013).
214 California alone spent nearly $25 billion on state employees in 2012.  
Schedule 4, Position and Salary Cost Estimates, CAL. ST. BUDGET, available at
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2013-14/pdf/BudgetSummary/BS_SCH4.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2013).
215 See Times Topics-Organized Labor, supra note 211.
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deciding factor when it comes to determining the continued viability 
of public sector unions.216
State employee pension obligations also weigh heavily in 
state government decision-making—“on average, a tax increase of 
$1,385 per U.S. household per year would be required, starting 
immediately and growing with the size of the public sector” to keep 
up with state and local public employee pension costs. 217
Meanwhile, citizens seem to be migrating from states with the 
highest public employee expenses to states with the lowest.218 Knox 
may provide an arrow in the quiver of states seeking to cut costs by 
reducing expenditures on government employees.
Unions, and SEIU in particular, are putting on a brave face in 
spite of the anti-union trends.219 SEIU continues to push its agenda 
at all levels of government.220 If union labor is to remain relevant, 
216 The state budget problem is exacerbated by the fact that heavily 
unionized states tend to be considered less business friendly, and thus less able to 
generate the business activity necessary to generate tax revenue.  See Michael 
Marlow, The Huge Cost of Public Unions, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2012), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/huge-cost-public-unions-article-1.1143138.
217 Robert Novy-Marx & Josh Rauh, The Looming Shortfall in Public 
Pension Costs, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2012), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-19/opinions/35498703_1_pension-
systems-defined-benefit-pensions-pension-benefits.
218 For example, nearly 60,000 people moved from California to Texas in 
2011.  Olga Spilewsky & Conan Nolan, California’s Population is Moving Out, 
Census Report Shows, NBC S. CAL. (Dec. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Californias-Population-Moving-Out-
182914961.html.  California ranks in the top five states for public employee costs 
whereas Texas is in the bottom ten.  Issue Brief: State and Local Government 
Spending on Public Employee Retirement Systems, NASRA (May 9, 2013), 
http://www.nasra.org/files/Issue%20Briefs/NASRACostsBrief.pdf.
219 See YATES, supra note 5, at 209 (“Perhaps the time will finally be right 
for workers everywhere to say enough is enough.”); Member Leadership and 
Action, SEIU.ORG, http://www.seiu.org/a/member-leadership-and-action.php (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2013) (“Whether it's lobbying local and national public officials, 
reaching out workers who don't have a union, or standing strong with your fellow 
SEIU members to make improvements at work, our member activists are leading 
the way.”).
220 For example, SEIU is involved in lobbying for comprehensive 
immigration reform, preservation of Medicare and Medicaid, and spending on 
federal jobs initiatives, among other priorities.  See generally SEIU.ORG,
http://www.seiu.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
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influencing politics may be its best hope.221 The November 2012 
California election is a clear example of a union political victory.222
VII. CONCLUSION
By the time Knox was decided in June of 2012, unions had 
long been on the decline. Private sector unions had been particularly 
hard-hit since reaching their membership peak in the 1950s.223 While 
public sector union membership has steadily gained as a percentage 
of total union members, government unions have shrunk over the 
past few years.224 Knox dealt with an issue near and dear to the 
hearts of both public and private sector unions: their ability to compel 
contributions from nonmembers whom they represent in collective 
bargaining.225
While, on its face, Knox deals only with public unions, its 
logic seems to apply to labor unions generally.226 Standing on the 
opinions in Abood and Hudson, the Court held that a public sector 
union could not collect funds from nonmembers via a special 
assessment in order to fund political or ideological activities.227 A
nonmember’s First Amendment right not to subsidize speech with 
which he or she disagrees strongly outweighed the desire on the part 
of a union to exact contributions from those who choose not to join
the union’s ranks.228
While the Court did not find the commonly used technique 
for calculating chargeable expenses—basing the current year’s 
221 See FAIRBROTHER & GRIFFIN, supra note 5, at 220 (“Politics has 
remained the most stable dimension of union strategy.  Unions continue to endorse 
and offer financial and other in-kind forms of support to pro-union candidates, 
most of whom are Democrats, while working to defeat anti-union candidates most 
of whom are Republicans.”).
222 See SEIU Local 521, supra note 204.
223 FAIRBROTHER & GRIFFIN, supra note 5, at 4.
224 See DEP’T LAB. BUREAU LAB. STAT, supra note 23.
225 See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 
(2012).
226 Cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (stating that the 
existence of state action was not determinative in deciding whether agency shop 
arrangements violated workers’ First Amendment rights).
227 Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2296.
228 Id. at 2294.
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assessment on the prior year’s financial records—unconstitutional, 
the majority’s language strongly suggested that such a system came 
dangerously close to running afoul of the First Amendment. 229
Surely, the Court reasoned, no expansion of a union’s ability to 
compel fees from nonmembers could be constitutionally allowed.230
Henceforth, any special assessment to raise funds to be used 
for a union’s political or ideological campaigns (and possibly any 
special assessment at all) requires issuing a fresh Hudson notice.231
Nonmembers must affirmatively opt in before any additional money 
can be deducted from their paychecks on behalf of the union.232
While this result was probably inevitable given the case law, 
it is difficult to view the holding as anything other than another blow 
to the plight of unions, particularly government employee unions.  
After the failed June 2012 recall election of Governor Scott Walker 
in Wisconsin and the passage of union-opposed ballot measures in 
the California cities of San Jose and San Diego, the Knox decision 
seemed to confirm that organized labor was caught in a downward 
spiral.
Given the current political, legal, and economic climate, 
union labor seems destined for irrelevance.  Recent election results to 
the contrary in the November 2012 California general election are 
likely to be a mere Pyrrhic victory for the union cause.  Government 
budget constraints and the high costs of unionized public workers and 
their pensions will ultimately be the undoing of public sector unions.  
Organized government labor will eventually go the way of its private 
counterpart and become a negligible force in American politics and 
economics.
229 Id. at 2291.
230 See id. at 2293.
231 Id. at 2296.
232 Id.
